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The ‘rise of China’ has clearly been one of the most significant events of recent years. 
Although that phrase does not capture all of the complexity and contradiction 
associated with China’s remarkable economic development, it does provide a useful 
shorthand for what is likely to prove one of the most consequential set of processes in 
the twenty-first century. Indeed, it is not too fanciful to suggest that the 
transformation that has occurred in China in little more than three decades may prove 
to be the most important set of interconnected economic, political, social and strategic 
processes in the history of the planet. Even if it all goes badly wrong—which is not at 
all impossible—whatever happens in China will, as Napoleon famously predicted, 
have truly world-shaking ramifications. 
 
But while the hyperbole may be justified for once, the question is, what will ‘China’ii 
do with all this newly acquired power and influence? Do China’s political elites have 
a vision for China and its place in the world? Will they inevitably seek to challenge or 
even usurp the United States’ position as the dominant power of the era, as some of 
the most influential international relations analysts would have us believe?iii More 
realistically, perhaps, will the East Asian region provide an important arena in which 
China’s growing foreign policy ambitions and objectives may be tested and perhaps 
even realized?iv These questions form the basis of the following discussion, but at the 
outset it is important to concede that the answers to such questions will necessarily be 
tentative and incomplete. The unprecedented nature of China’s recent transformation, 
the fluid nature of the international system, and the unpredictable nature of the 
response to China’s growing assertiveness, all make prediction difficult if not 
foolhardy. What we can try to do is to identify  the factors that are likely to constrain 
or facilitate China’s capacity to self-consciously shape the international system of 
which it is an increasingly consequential part. 
 
The central argument that I develop in what follows is that—at this stage, at least—
China’s ability to provide ‘international leadership’ is limited. This is, I suggest, 
partly because of the nature of the existing international system, partly because of 
domestic constraints, and partly because any attempt to do so is likely to be met with 
limited enthusiasm at best, outright hostility at worst. To develop this argument I 
initially provide some theoretical and historical context with which to explain the 
particular constraints and possibilities that confront China. Following this I give more 
specific consideration to the particular circumstances that obtain in East Asia where 
any Chinese leadership ambitions are likely to be tested first. Finally, I offer some 





Leadership or hegemony? 
 
To suggest that the international system is in flux is hardly controversial. Both the 
apparent decline of the United States and the emergence of the so-called ‘BRIC’ 
economies  are indicative of major changes in the established order and raise 
questions about the future direction, purpose and structure of the international order.v 
Most fundamentally, does the international order actually need ‘leadership’ of the sort 
we have become used to associating with the United States? Before we can answer 
that question and decide whether China or anyone else for that matter, may be capable 
of providing it, we need to remember what American leadership or hegemony actually 
looked like. 
 
For a generation of American scholars in particular, there was something about the 
United States, its norms and values, the attractiveness of its culture and society that 
meant it was ‘bound to lead’.vi It is no coincidence, of course, that such views not 
only reflect an American sensibility, but they are influential primarily because of the 
United States’ position in the world. Since the Second World War the United States 
has enjoyed an unparalleled dominance in the international system that even 
sympathetic observers recognized allowed American policymakers to shape the 
international system in ways that reflected and furthered their interests.vii For all the 
attention that has understandably been paid to the US’s ideational influence and ‘soft 
power’, the original foundation of its dominance was crudely material: in the 
aftermath of the Second World War with Europe, Japan and China in ruins the United 
States economy accounted for nearly 30 per cent of global GDP.viii 
 
The reason we are all currently preoccupied with China is precisely the same: most 
observers think that, all other things being equal, China is on track to overtake the 
United States as the world’s largest economy sometime in the next decade or two.ix 
The question is what, if anything, China’s leaders might want or be able to do with 
this material potential. In the case of the US the answer was—rather a lot. But this 
raises a further comparative question: was the emergence of American hegemony or 
leadership a product of unique, unrepeatable historical and geopolitical 
circumstances? To begin to answer this question and consider its implications for 
China, it is useful to make an initial distinction between leadership and hegemony. 
Although the differences are often subtle, the United States has exercised both at 
times and it is helpful to say how. 
 
 
The American way of hegemony 
 
One of the most influential contributions to our understanding of the nature and 
possible importance of international leadership was provided by Charles 
Kindleberger. In Kindleberger’s seminal analysis of the Great Depression, he argued 
that one of its principal causes was an absence of leadership, because 
 
The international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a country that is 
prepared, consciously or unconsciously, under some system of rules that it has 
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internalized, to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others 
to follow them…x 
 
Because the UK was incapable and the US was unwilling, no country provided the 
sort of leadership Kindleberger argued was necessary to prevent the international 
economy breaking down as a consequence of protectionism, competitive currency 
devaluations and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. The big lessons that America’s post 
war policymakers took from the economic catastrophe of the inter-war period were 
firstly, that it must never happen again, and secondly, there were potentially ways of 
ensuring that it didn’t. In this context, leadership can usefully be distinguished as ‘the 
use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end.’xi 
 
The consequences of these conclusions are well known but merit brief restatement 
because they give a possible measure of the task confronting China if it is to ever 
replace the US at the centre of a more or less regulated international economic order. 
The principal institutional manifestation of the US’s new power and willingness to 
use it internationally was the creation of the so-called Bretton Woods institutions, 
created with the intention of providing collective goods and resolving the collective 
action problems that had plagued the inter-war system. Whatever one may think about 
the subsequent operation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (later replaced by the World Trade 
Organization),  they provided an institutionalized foundation for a particular vision of 
economic and political order. Not only were these institutions imbued with a 
particular set of liberal values and operating principles, but they offered a stark 
alternative to the model followed by the Soviet Union and its allies.xii 
 
The ideological contest that so distinguished the Cold War period gives an important 
clue to the difference between leadership and hegemony.xiii The United States 
undoubtedly exercised leadership when it decided to prod the Western Europeans into 
greater cooperation in the postwar period: not only were the war-weary, weakened 
Europeans receptive to a little prodding,xiv but in the Marshall Plan the US had a 
powerful set of incentives that actually made cooperation immediately worth while.xv 
This is, I think, is a rather different process than the one that subsequently drew other 
countries into the American orbit. True, the Cold War and the implacable logic of 
geopolitical confrontation may have focused the minds of friend and foe alike, but as 
even radical critics have noted, institutionalized American hegemony offered long-
term incentives and payoffs that made it attractive in its own right, even to states that 
might not have been traditional allies.xvi Hegemony may, as Robert Cox argues, 
ultimately be about securing the dominance of a particular state, but it can do so 
because it  
 
…creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning 
according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the 
leading state or states and leading social classes but at the same time offer some 
measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful. [Emphasis added]xvii 
 
Some of these principles would need to be universal if the idea of hegemony is to 
have analytical purchase: the counter-intuitive idea of domination through consent 
would seem to be central among them. And yet what is distinctive about the American 
experience is that, as Ruggie pointed out, ‘it was the fact of an American hegemony 
that was decisive after World War II, not merely American hegemony.’xviii [Emphasis 
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in original]. In other words, while there may be common characteristics about 
hegemonic rule, the particular style or content may vary by country and period. This 
potential for difference would seem likely to characterize any future Chinese 
hegemony; it certainly distinguishes its earlier periods of dominance. 
 
Hegemony with Chinese characteristics? 
 
Whether we describe it as hegemony, dominance, civilizational influence or some 
other term, China has exerted a powerful influence over what we now think of as 
‘East Asia’. There are a number of problems in attempting to compare China’s 
historical role in East Asia with the United States’ position in the contemporary 
system, not the least being differences in scale, operational style and constituent parts. 
American hegemony is the first truly global system of domination, although it is 
important to recognize that China dominated its ‘world’ until the intrusion of 
European powers made it painfully apparent that, not only were there other worlds out 
there as it were, but they had achieved markedly superior levels of development—at 
least when measured in terms of the deeply interconnected realms of military and 
political innovation.xix Ironically enough, given that Western technological progress 
borrowed so heavily from China,xx it was largely the assumed superiority of Chinese 
civilization that left its dynastic rulers so ill-prepared to meet the challenge of 
European imperialism.xxi 
 
Before the Europeans arrived, however, things were rather different. Chinese culture, 
especially ideas drawn from Confucian philosophy, have exerted a powerful influence 
on Japan, Korea and Vietnam in particular.
xxiii
xxii More importantly and tangibly, China’s 
influence and its relationship with other ‘states’ of the region was formalized in the 
‘tribute system’. Although the political structures of pre-modern Asia were a good 
deal looser, less precisely delimited geographically, and more personalized than their 
Westphalian equivalents in Europe,  China presided over a regional hierarchy that 
recognized its own dominance in the tribute missions dispatched by the likes of Japan, 
Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia.  
 
As far back as the Tang dynasty (618-907AD), China’s neighbors acknowledged its 
status as the leading power in the region by sending diplomatic delegations to pay 
homage. At one level this was ritualistic performance that had a limited impact on the 
subordinate powers that acknowledged China’s superior status. But while the tribute 
system may have been largely symbolic, it has been argued that it provided an 
important stabilizing influence in a region with no formal mechanisms to manage 
intra-regional relations. David Kang (2010: 10) suggests that ‘far more than a thin 
veneer of meaningless social lubricants, the tribute system and its ideas and 
institutions formed the basis of relations between states.’xxiv Kang has also claimed 
that when China has been strong, the historical record suggests that what we now 
think of as East Asia has generally been stable and relatively peaceful.xxv  
 
Kang’s depiction of Chinese stability has been challenged, both from an historical 
perspective,
xxvii
xxvi and especially as a consequence of China’s recent, increasingly 
assertive, behavior in various regional territorial disputes.  While there is plainly 
some merit in these criticisms, the general point to make about China’s prominent 
historical role in the region is that firstly it is not unprecedented, and that, secondly, 
China was instrumental in creating some of the region’s most distinctive institutions. 
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As Zhang and Buzan point out, ‘Fundamental institutions defined and shaped by these 
[historical and social] processes do not just reflect the hegemonic institutional 
preferences, but also represent a collective solution invented by, and consented to 
among, East Asian states to the perennial problem of inter-state conflict, co-existence 
and cooperation.’xxviii 
 
Perhaps the most striking difference between this Chinese form of dominance and the 
contemporary period is that whereas the tribute system was marked by formal 
inequality but informal equality in practice, in the ideal-typical Westphalian system 
the picture is reversed: formal equality but a markedly hierarchical and unequal state 
system.xxix Whether this system of tributary relations is ever likely to be reconstituted 
would seem highly unlikely, but one that is not discounted by some observers.xxx But 
whether it reappears in this precise form or not, the significance of the tribute system 
for the purposes of this discussion is twofold: first, there is a (significantly longer) 
precedent for effective Chinese dominance, one that differed in important ways from 
the contemporary system;xxxi second, there is no reason to suppose that in any future 
hegemonic order will necessarily replicate the one established under the auspices of 
American power. Having said that, the enduring nature of American power continues 
to place limits on China’s global and regional ambitions.  
 
 
East Asia and the ‘China model’ 
 
Despite China’s unprecedented economic expansion and the fact that it has rapidly 




is still something of a surprise to be talking about its potential to lead the region—its 
historical role not withstanding. After all, as recently as the 1980s, China was still an 
impoverished ‘Third World’ nation on the fringes of the international system. As 
recently as the 1970s, the People’s Republic was primarily seen by many of its 
neighbors in Southeast Asia in particular as a dangerous source of revolutionary 
ideology —fears that were reinforced by the existence of a large diaspora of 
‘overseas Chinese’ throughout the region. There was little reason to suppose that a 
such a disparate group of people—often with few direct links to the mainland, whose 
main claim to fame was as disproportionately successful capitalists —could 
constitute a coherent force of any sort, much less one that might obediently follow the 
injunctions of communist China.xxxv  
 
Nevertheless, it is testimony to the divisive, paranoia-inducing impact of the Cold 
War that fears about both China and ethnically-Chinese people in the region were 
rampant. Even more importantly, the geopolitics of the region throughout the Cold 
war period made region-wide leadership of any sort, let alone by China, an 
impossibility. The overwhelming strategic reality of Cold War Asia was that it was 
divided along ideological lines, a situation that was reinforced by a strategic 
architecture that revolved around the series of ‘hub-and-spokes’ alliances established 
by the US in the aftermath of the Second World War.xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxviii
 Unlike Europe, where 
American hegemony underpinned European integration,  in East Asia it had 
precisely the opposite effect. Unsurprisingly this had the effect  of isolating China 
from many of its neighbors and reinforcing fears about the negative impact of 







China’s reemergence as a regional and world power was the result of a series of 
internal reforms driven primarily by Deng Xiaoping.xxxix The process or ‘opening up’ 
the Chinese economy has been extensively detailed, as have its remarkable 
consequences. One of the most important symbolic and consequential initiatives 
undertaken by China’s leaders as the process of liberalization and integration gathered 
pace, though, was the decision to join the WTO. Susan Shirk describes China’s 
decision to join the WTO as ‘the best thing that ever happened to China’s regional 
relations’,xl and it is not hard to see why: not only did this have the effect of further 
accelerating the process of economic expansion and integration, but it did so in a way 
that indicated Chinese leaders were going to play by the rules established under the 
auspices of American hegemony. 
 
The extent of the reforms undertaken by China in order to join the WTO ‘far surpass’ 
any that have been required of previous applicants,xli and involved actually rewriting 
parts of the Chinese constitution.xlii At first blush, this would seem to be an 
unambiguous expression of American dominance: after all, China has been forced to 
adjust to a regulatory and even normative framework that has been largely created 
directly or indirectly in the United States. The pursuit of ‘socialism’ in China has been 
reduced to a rhetorical flourish, the primary purpose of which would seem to be 
giving some ideological continuity to a communist party largely legitimated by its 
ability to deliver growth in a global capitalist economy.  
 
Edward Steinfeld persuasively argues that the transformation of China has a more 
fundamental material basis: as Chinese industries, companies and workers are 
integrated more deeply into global production networks and the organizational logics 
that underpin them, they are inexorably transformed by the processes of which they 
are a part. For Steinfeld,  
 
China today is growing not by writing its own rules, but instead by internalizing the 
rules of the advanced industrial West. It has grown not by conjuring up its own 
unique political-economic institutions but instead by increasingly harmonizing with 
our own.xliii 
 
If these claims about the impact of regulatory compliance and even the very nature of 
production processes themselves are correct, then the implications are profound: even 
if China does become the largest economy in the world, and even if it does see a 
steady increase in its international influence as a consequence, it will do so as a 
successful capitalist economy, not as the standard bearer for a radically different set 
of ideas or practices.  
 
This is a potentially very significant point, as many observers have cast doubt on 
China’s ability to lead.xliv Because China does not have a coherent vision or 
alternative model to offer would-be followers its capacity to offer leadership is 
circumscribed, the argument goes. Whatever one may think about the impact and 
underpinning logic of the so-called ‘Washington consensus’, it did represent a fairly 
coherent set of policy proposals and implicit normative values.xlv Few people are 
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making similar arguments about the ‘Beijing consensus,xlvi and there are consequently 
questions about whether the ‘China model’ exists, much less offers an alternative to 
the dominant political and economic paradigm of the post-war era. 
 
The China model 
 
Even though China has arguably reemerged into the international system as a highly 
successful capitalist economy and increasingly influential participant in the 
institutions of international governance, it is sufficiently different to represent a  
practical and theoretical challenge. In analytical terms, the key question is how far the 
supposed ‘socialization’ process has actually influenced the thinking and world views 
in China.xlvii
xlviii
 I say more about this later in the context of China’s foreign policy, but it 
is important to remember that change in ‘ruling ideas’ happens at a number of levels: 
in analyses of the sort I am undertaking here, the focus is invariably on elite level 
actors who are often unrepresentative of broader social opinion. While it is difficult to 
generalize about public opinion in non-democratic China, views about economic, 
foreign and social policy are clearly becoming more varied and critical. Having said 
that, it is also striking that such surveys of public opinion as do exist invariably 
suggest that China’s government enjoys high levels of public support —and 
generally much higher than their democratic equivalents in the West. 
 
This is potentially important because, for all the alarmist predictions that have been 
made about China’s future, thus far at least, the Chinese Communist Party has 
remained firmly in control.xlix Moreover, there are few signs at this stage that China’s 
growing domestic bourgeoisie is clamoring for the sort of political transformation that 
characterized politics in the West at similar stage of development—if it is possible to 
make those sorts of comparisons given all that has happened in between. What we can 
say is that China’s capitalists seem—like their counterparts in the West—intent on 
making money and are quite happy to work with China’s authoritarian, undemocratic 
government if this is the price for guaranteeing social stability and private 
profitability.l Although much can change in a country that is prone to the occasional 
revolutionary upheaval, the foundations of the Chinese model of capitalism look 
reasonably secure, and this may be one of their attractions to other countries seeking 
to replicate China’s broad-ranging economic and social development.li 
 
Plainly, any attractions the China model may have are likely to be limited primarily to 
countries that are rather closer to the beginning of the developmental continuum, 
rather than the end. For this reason, many have pointed to China’s growing economic 
and diplomatic influence in Africa as evidence of the attractiveness of the China 
model.lii Given the ‘pragmatic’ basis of the Beijing consensus—do whatever seems to 
work, even if that means having an authoritarian state and cavalier attitude to human 
rights—and the significant developmental challenges in much of Africa, such views 
are understandable, perhaps. And yet is striking that China stands accused of ‘neo-
colonialism’ and neo-mercantilism’, and the impact of its policies have drawn 
growing criticism, and not just in the West.liii Nevertheless, there are aspects of 
China’s approach to development that are not only arguably attractive in 
themselves—to the economic and political elites who are most likely to benefit from 
them, at least—but which may compel a degree of emulation for precisely the same 
reasons the Westpahalian state was adopted throughout the world in the nineteenth 
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century: because they confer competitive advantages that leave rivals little option but 
to follow suit.liv 
 
The emergence of ‘state capitalism’ has attracted growing attention as the rise of the 
BRIC economies has become synonymous with the emergence of a very different 
style of political and economic organization to that associated with the Washington 
consensus. As Ian Bremmer points out,  
 
State capitalism is not the reemergence of  socialist central planning in a twenty-first 
century package. It is a form of bureaucratically engineered capitalism particular to 
each government that practices it. It’s a system in which the state dominates markets 
primarily for political gain.lv 
 
Such a formulation not only helps to explain the durability and perhaps the success of 
capitalist development in China, but it also explains why it is such a challenge to the 
extant order that has been dominated by the West generally and more recently by the 
US in particular for the last 150 years or so. In an East Asian context, what is 
especially significant about China’s style of development and state-government 
relations is that it is entirely in keeping with a tradition of developmental success that 
has distinguished East Asia in the post-war period.lvi While there may not be a ‘China 
model’ that other countries would either want or be able to adopt,lvii there may be 
sufficient commonalities of history and experience to make China’s potential 
influence more significant than many in the west would like to think. 
 
Can China lead East Asia? 
 
Before European imperialism overturned the old order in Asia, China was its 
undisputed leader, even if the nature of its leadership was rather passive and 
customary.  But Asia before the nineteenth century was a very different place: we 
cannot simply assume that just because China has led the region in the past it could do 
so again, or that the factors that underpinned its dominance and the stability of the 
region then are relevant now. In trying to decide whether China can lead a number of 
interconnected questions seem relevant: does China have the capacity to lead? How 
are its leadership ambitions likely to be received in Asia and elsewhere? Is the sort of 
leadership or even hegemony associated with the US either possible, necessary or 
desirable in the twenty-first century? 
 
China’s grand strategy 
 
While China clearly has one of the most important qualities for becoming a major 
actor in regional and even world affairs—the second largest economy in the world—
translating material weight into influence is not a straightforward process. China’s 
great regional rival, Japan, is a reminder of just how difficult it can be to make the 
transition from developmental superstar to aspiring great power. True, there were (and 
still are) particular domestic and external impediments that inhibited Japan’s foreign 
policy ambitions, not the least of which is its continuing strategic dependence on the 
United States.lviii While China plainly doesn’t have the same problem with the United 
States—quite the contrary, in fact—it has suffered from Japanese-style inhibitions 
about assuming too prominent a place in world affairs. Deng Xiaoping’s famous 
dictum that Chinese foreign policy should ‘adopt a low profile and never take the 
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lead’ is remarkably like Japan’s ‘Yoshida doctrine’, which also placed an emphasis on 
domestic development and national strengthening.lix The question in China’s case is 
whether the period of domestic development has been effectively accomplished and 
its foreign policy ought to reflect its new status.lx 
 
China’s foreign policy-making process is notoriously opaque and difficult to decipher. 
Ultimate responsibility for foreign policy decisions, like so much else, resides with 
the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) has notional responsibility for constructing China’s foreign policy, in reality, 
as Jakobson and Knox point out in one of the few detailed analyses of China’s 
decision-making processes, the MFA ‘is today merely one actor in the realm of 
foreign policy and not necessarily the most important one.’lxi Significantly, no single 
member of the PSC has sole responsibility for foreign affairs, a situation that 
inevitably makes policymaking more contested and less focused. Adding to the 
uncertainty is the fact that there are a growing number of actors both inside and 
outside government attempting to influence the construction and content of policy. 
Not only do other government departments or actors such as the Ministry of 
Commerce or the People’s Liberation Army seek to influence policy, but so too do a 
growing number of non-state actors in universities, think tanks and even the 
blogosphere. The result, argues David Shambaugh, is a ‘conflicted’ China with no 
single  sense of national identity.lxii 
 
This is not to say that the Chinese government does not have broadly consistent long-
term goals or even a ‘grand strategy’, however. Like Japan before it, China’s leaders 
have adopted a form of ‘comprehensive security’,lxiii consciously linking political, 
economic and military issues to achieve security and great power status. Avery 
Goldstein argues that China’s grand strategy has three core components: 
 
Politically, China pursues multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to mute threat 
perceptions and to convince others of the benefits of engagement and the 
counterproductive consequences of containment. Economically, China nurtures 
relations with diverse trading partners and sources of foreign investment, weaving a 
network of economic relations to limit the leverage of any single partner in setting the 
terms of China’s international economic involvement. Militarily, China seeks to 
create sole breathing space for modernization of its armed forces.lxiv 
 
Whether China should now be considered a ‘great’ or merely a ‘regional’ power is 
debatable,lxv but as Zhang and Tang point out, at an empirical level China’s influence 
is still likely to be manifest mainly at the regional level, so its policy in East Asia can 
be considered as ‘the core of its grand strategy’.lxvi Its principal features, they argue, 
are an abiding consciousness of American hegemony, a desire to cultivate good 
regional relations, and an embrace of multilateralism and good international 
citizenship. Whether these goals are reconcilable with each other or the rapidly 
evolving context within which regional relations are being played out is a moot point. 
Nowhere illustrates these tensions more clearly than China’s relations with Southeast 
Asia. 
 
Is China’s policy charming… 
 
For those observers who emphasize the importance of ‘socializing’ China into good 
behavior its relations with Southeast Asia offer grounds for optimism. There plainly 
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has been a dramatic change  from China’s position as a destabilizing exporter of 
revolutionary ideology little more than thirty years ago, to its current role as an 
important part of the East Asian region’s burgeoning institutional architecture. 
China’s regular participation in organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum—
the principal security grouping in the broader ‘Asia-Pacific region’lxvii—has clearly 
had an impact on the diplomatic elites who participate. Undoubtedly such events have 
contributed to ‘confidence building’ and must be given some credit for the overall 
peace and stability that distinguishes the region. 
 
It is also important to recognize that China has actively reinforced this appearance of 
being what Robert Zoellick famously described as a ‘responsible stakeholder’,lxviii by  
unleashing a ‘charm offensive’ on the Southeast Asian region in particular.lxix A 
number of points merit emphasis about this overall attempt by China to improve 
relations within the region generally and with Southeast Asia in particular. First, it 
implicitly recognizes the potential value of participation in regional institutions and 
the possibility that this is not necessarily incompatible with the pursuit of ‘national 
interests’.lxx On the contrary, long-term objectives may be achieved more effectively 
by cultivating good relations with other states and minimizing potential points of 
resistance to a Chinese agenda. 
 






concept that was until recently almost exclusively associated with the United States. 
Not only did the US’s own ideational influence and standing go into steep decline 
during the administration of George W Bush,  but China’s also rose independently. 
Although there have been important discursive efforts on China’s part to reassure 
perennially nervous Southeast Asian states about the implications of what China 
insists is its ‘peaceful rise’,  these rhetorical innovations have been reinforced by 
more tangible gestures. China’s decision not to devalue its currency at the height of 
the Asian crisis in 1998 was not only well received by the region, but it signaled 
China’s (re)emergence as a decisive economic and political force in regional 
affairs.  This policy of using its economic leverage to pursue long-term diplomatic 
goals in Southeast Asia was taken to new heights when China suggested establishing 
a free trade area with ASEAN. Although this was entirely in keeping with broader 
developments in the region,lxxv the fact that Chinese policymakers were willing to 
give ASEAN an ‘early harvest’ of unilateral trade liberalization and access to China’s 
rapidly expanding domestic market highlighted the costs China was willing to bear to 
cultivate good relations.   
 
We might be forgiven for thinking that China’s soft power is growing and that its 
charm offensive has been a success. But not only is it important to remember that the 
charm offensive was partly designed to off-set the earlier ‘China threat’ theory that 
emerged primarily from the US,lxxvii but China’s own recent actions have undermined 




Over the past last one or two years there has been a noteworthy shift in China’s 
foreign policy, one that casts doubt on its ability to provide regional leadership.lxxviii
lxxix
 
Two issues in particular have sparked renewed regional anxiety. First, there is a 
growing concern about increases in Chinese defense spending.  Although there has 
 11 
been a noteworthy increase in spending as China attempts to modernize its military, it 




lxxx However, what has caused particular alarm is China’s 
acquisition of an aircraft carrier and a new generation of anti-ship missiles which 
some observers think may change the strategic balance in the region.  Defense 
spending across the region  has increased as a consequence, reinforcing the views of 
those who see the region as inherently unstable.  
 
The second development that has caused alarm has been China’s increasingly 
assertive, even confrontational, approach to territorial disputes around the region 
generally, and in the South China Sea in particular. By some estimates oil reserves in 





 Since becoming an oil importer as recently as the mid 1990s, 
questions of energy security have begun to assume an increasingly prominent place in 
China’s foreign policy priorities and calculations.  It is not hard to see why: the 
principal source of legitimacy for the ‘communist’ elites that still govern China is 
their ability to continue delivering economic growth and social stability.  Both of 
these would be threatened by any deterioration or transformation in China’s external 
sources of supply. The South China Sea could play a crucial role in insuring against 
such an eventuality, which helps to explain both China’s confrontational stance and 
its interest in developing the capacity protect the vital sea lanes through which 
resources must travel.  
 
The other significant aspect of China’s approach to its territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea is its reluctance to multilateralize them. Despite the existence of the ARF, 




China prefers to exercise its greater power and leverage through bilateral channels in 
this particular issue area.  While China has demonstrated a willingness to play an 
active role in regional and even global institutions, this has not been at the expense of 
national sovereignty, which remains paramount in Chinese strategic thinking.  In 
this respect, at least, for all the unhappiness China’s behaviour may cause amongst 
Southeast Asian political elites, China’s preference for sovereignty-enhancing 
regional institutions is entirely in keeping with ASEAN’s own fundamental 
principles. The question is whether such an approach can provide the basis of a 
leadership role for China at the regional level, let alone the global stage. 
 
The constraints on Chinese leadership 
 
It has been widely noted that Japan and China are rivals when it comes to regional 
leadership.xc This helps to account for the relative feebleness and growing number of 
regional institutions: China, Japan, Indonesia and Australia have all proposed, or are 
associated with, different regional institutions and/or visions, which often have roles 
that potentially overlap and even compete.xci In the case of China’s preferred regional 
option—ASEAN plus 3 (APT), which includes the ASEAN states along with China, 
Japan and South Korea—there is no doubt that alternative proposals from the likes of 
Japan and Australia are actually designed to compete with, and diminish the influence 
of,  the APT grouping. Many of China’s neighbors are concerned about the 
development of an organization that is exclusively East Asian and that is likely to be 
dominated by China. A more encompassing definition of the region that includes the 
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United States, by contrast, is seen as a way of limiting China’s influence and keeping 
the United States strategically engaged in the region.xcii 
 
This marks an important change of direction in the region, and needs to be seen as 
part of a long-running contest to define the region itself and its constituent 
membership.xciii In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and with the 
enthusiastic support of Malaysia, it seemed that institution-building in the region 
would not only take-off, but it would do with an exclusively Asian membership.xciv 
Now, however, things look rather different. China’s growing material importance, its 
military modernization and its increasingly assertive behavior have caused growing 
alarm in Washington. Long preoccupied with the Middle East, many strategic analysts 
in the US have suddenly become concerned about the possible challenge China poses 
to America’s assumed leadership in the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region. The recent ‘pivot’ in 
American foreign policy and the reprioritization of strategic ties with traditional allies 
such as Australia and Japan, and even former foes like Vietnam, is evidence of this 
new policy focus.xcv The reassertion of American strategic influence in the Asia-
Pacific is one more manifestation of a number of factors that suggest the China’s 
capacity to supply regional, much less global, leadership as conventionally 





There has been a direct response to China’s rise that is increasingly focused on the 
possible strategic implications of its growing power and apparent willingness to use it 
in the context of areas such as the South China Sea. While Chinese authorities 
continue to accumulate material weight and leverage in international affairs—as its 
symbiotic economic relationship with the United States vividly reminds us
xcvii
xcvi—it is 
not easy to translate this latent power into influence, much less leadership of the sort 
we have traditionally associated with a single country such as the US. But this may 
not be a failing of Chinese leadership so much, perhaps, as a more general indication 
of a profound change in the nature of the international system more generally. It is a 
striking feature of the contemporary system that no individual state or collective 
actor—not even the formerly ‘hegemonic’ United States, and certainly not the 
increasingly ineffectual EU—seems able provide the sort of leadership that 
Kindleberger once thought was pivotal. This may, however, be more cause for 
celebration than consternation. True, there may be formidable regulatory and 
collective action problems in the increasingly integrated international economy, but 
this may be a small price to pay if we collectively avoid the strategic excesses that 
were unleashed at the height of the Bush administration’s period of ‘unipolarity’. 
Whether George W. Bush provided ‘leadership’ or simply demonstrated the dangers 
of unfettered unilateralism is debatable, but as Barry Buzan persuasively argues, 
moving toward a world without superpowers and the sort of ‘leadership’ they have 
traditionally supplied ‘may be no bad thing’.   
 
At a theoretical level, this may mean that some of the assumptions and concomitant 
fears about ‘hegemonic transition’ are misplaced.xcviii Although it is not possible to 
address this issue in any detail here,xcix the key point to emphasize is that it may be 
inappropriate to infer any inevitable consequences as a result of China’s rise—should 
it continue. We have only two real examples of modern hegemonic orders (if  we 
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discount China’s), and the circumstances in which Britain and perhaps even the US 
dominated the system are already becoming anachronisms. Even if China does 
eventually assume the sort of dominant position its growing material weight implies it 
might, the historical circumstances that underpinned Britain’s and America’s 
dominance look unique and unrepeatable. Even in East Asia, where we might expect 
China’s influence to be most readily felt, at this stage there is little evidence of any 
‘bandwagonning’, much less identification with Chinese goals.c This is hardly 
surprising: not only are the geopolitical circumstances that might encourage such 
ideological isomorphism absent, but so, too,  is any Chinese ‘vision’ around which 
followers might coalesce—over-excited discussions of the self-serving, essentially 
nationalistic Beijing consensus notwithstanding.ci 
 
And yet despite East Asia’s checkered history, in which China has played a large and 
often tragic part, there are, perhaps, some grounds for cautious optimism. Despite the 
relentlessly gloomy predictions that are made by historical analogy about East Asia’s 
prospects and the inevitability of conflict and hegemonic competition, thus far at 
least, the region remains remarkably stable. It is also, of course, the centre of the 
greatest economic development story the world has ever seen. There is much to lose 
by undermining this essentially benign state of affairs. If there are lessons to be drawn 
form European history, perhaps they are about the desirability of some sort of 
‘concert of powers’ in which regional states—and perhaps a post-hegemonic United 
States, too—reach some sort of mutual accommodation.cii This may not be the sort of 
leadership to which we’ve become accustomed, but it may prove more durable than 
some historical alternatives. 
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